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Despite eighteen years of effort to establish a quasi-democratic fundamentalist regime,
Iranian elections saw the crushing defeat of the ruling elite's candidate. This election result
represents a popular call for a change in direction for the Islamic regime. Iran is not alone in
their battle to reconcile fundamentalist religious doctrine and progression into the Twenty-first
century. Tradition based economies and their requisite structures of government are relevant
throughout the world today. With few exceptions these systems have been unable to produce
states with effective economies. Without a sustainable growth rate in the economy, dealing
with the almost universal population explosions seen in these fundamentalist based systems is
proving impossible. Frequent meddling in the economy and social fabric of the nation to try
and influence market driven outcomes seems to leave these structures of government destined
for revision. This thesis applies recent advances in the theory of structures of government to
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Despite eighteen years of effort to establish a quasi-democratic fundamentalist regime,
Iranian elections saw the crushing defeat of the ruling elite's candidate. The election of Seyyed
Mohammad Khatami to the presidency indicates a profound disillusionment with the results to
date of the Islamic revolution. Khatami, a dark horse in the election process because of his
ouster from the Ministry of Culture in the early 1990's, was swept into office with 70 percent
ofthe popular vote. His landslide victory should be interpreted as a clear signal that the people
of Iran are looking for government that is less intrusive in their private lives, is better able to
manage the economy, and provides a rising standard of living to match the growth in
population. Iran is not alone in its battle to reconcile fundamentalist religious doctrines and
progress. Still its extensive application offundamentalist principles provides a unique insight to
the difficulties ofthese systems.
Clearly, many differences in fundamentalist based systems could be attributed to
differences in religious theology. Less obvious is the proposition that the application of
economic theory concerning structures of government and economic growth often provide
equally valuable insight. The main proposition developed in this thesis is that by separating the
complex questions of religious theology and management of the economy, it becomes possible
to see how fundamentalist systems have the potential for success.
Theologians in fundamentalist systems often contribute significantly to economic and
social chaos. They attempt to 'reform" government structures according to religious dogma.
This thesis argues that a religiously based government has not much sympathy or
understanding of such secular affairs as economics and law. Only by scientific control of the
economy and by encouragement of a legal system under which a government is held
accountable, can the validity of a fundamentalist society be maintained. It is further argued that
the effects of stability and growth on the economy of a fundamentalist regime will benefit its
transition to a market-based structure under a centrally planned system. This transition is both
profitable and important for long term growth in today's global marketplace. It is perhaps
Western oriented to apply the concept of economic growth as an appropriate measure of
XI
economic success. However, there seems to be no other accessible measure which can be
applied across cultural lines with hope of measuring the benefits of sound government
structures which lead to economic success.
To develop these propositions, this thesis provides the reader with a general analysis of
fundamentalist based systems including the major, recognized, religious systems of Buddhism,
Confucianism, Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. From this examination, a focus on
the specifics of Islam is included to allow a better understanding of the difficulties facing
fundamentalist systems. While this thesis chose Islam to represent the generalities of
fundamentalist systems because of its sweeping implementation in Iran, there are few reasons
that analysis of any of the fundamentalist systems implemented as thoroughly, would not
provide similar findings of the use of social control to achieve religious goals. The current
Western perception of fundamentalist systems is that these systems are unique and relatively
unimportant to the West. To mediate this perception it is important to understand Iran and its
potential for success.
Economic theory dealing with the importance of sound, stable structures of
government is designed to establish an environment suitable for investment. Stable
environments which lead to economic growth are a critical element of this thesis. This theory
is used to identify differences in government structures which may lead to or detract from
economic growth. The importance of credibility to stability is illustrated in discussion of the
time consistency problem. Further, the ability to classify the structures of government and the
importance of establishing a rule of law system is presented. The absolute necessity of
subjecting governments to law is another point which may be argued. For who would want to
rule a system in which one has no control? This thesis argues that it is not a complete
subjection to the law of the system which is required for success, rather it is the establishment
of some limitations on the power of a ruler. Ironically, from these limitations, credibility can be
enhanced as economic stability and growth are achieved.
xii
The next probable crisis in Iran is likely to be found in the nation's youthful population
increase. This expanding segment of society is already taxing the social structures of
government. As these youths age, they will create an even greater burden for the
government's social welfare programs. The solution to the existing and likely worsening
economic stagnation seems to be a move toward establishing economic stability through
market structures of government. Current developmental theory suggests a correlation
between government structures and elements of economic stability. While the specific impact
of religion and leadership on these developments may be debated, this thesis argues that there
are conclusions to be drawn as to the likely evolution of political and economic systems. These
conclusions suggest the cohesiveness displayed by Iran during its debt crisis in 1993 was not
unique and when necessary, support for extreme policies can be achieved. Regime credibility is
established by arriving at consensus, while the implementation of strict social policies serves to
further enhance this credibility. Economic stability is founded on credibility, good structures,
transition, and growth.
In summary, while separation of the institutions of religion and government is desirable
in terms of establishing economic stability, it is not entirely a requisite. A credible move
towards restricting the ruling elite's ability to influence market events at will should suffice to
encourage investors that Iran is on the right track. A firm commitment to the principles of free
markets today, while holding its own challenges in the future, may allow Iran to avoid a failed
economic system in the future. As Iran represents the most thorough implementation of
fundamentalist structures, this thesis suggests that other fundamentalist systems are likely to
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"Ifmen were angels, no government would be necessary."
James Madison
President of the United States
Recent elections in Iran point to a new direction for the revolution and the nation. The
election of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami to the presidency indicates a profound disillusionment
with the results to date, of the 18 year old Islamic revolution. ' Khatami was a dark horse in
the election and had not often been mentioned in Western press accounts of the election
process because of his ouster from the Ministry of Culture in the early 1990's by the powerful
religious elements in the government.
2
His election can be attributed to several influences, all
ofwhich indicate dissatisfaction and disillusionment with both the structure and the practice of
the government in Iran.
3
These factors include continued oppression by secret police forces,
inefficient bureaucratic structures, rampant inflation, and a floundering economy.
Khatami's election should be interpreted as a signal that the people of Iran are looking
for a government that is less intrusive in their private lives, is better able to manage the
economy, and provides a rising standard of living. This revamped government seems to have
initiated a move towards an "inclusive" interpretation of Islam rather than the "exclusive"
model that the clerics had been advocating. 5 Interpreting the new Iran will be addressed
several times in this paper because of variations in perspective which have led to a variety of
Murphy, Paul, "Iran on the Rocks," The Electric Library, Vol. 12, January 01, 1997, p.100.
Kaplan, Robert D., "Why the US and Iran Will Be Friends Again," The Wall Street Journal, February 10,
1997. See also Swindells, Steven, "New Iran President Faces Tough Economic Challenges," Reuters, May
05, 1997.
Viorst, Milton, "The Limits of the Revolution, Changing Iran", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No 6,
November/December 1995, p. 68.
Kaplan, "Friends Again," see also Murphy, "Iran on the Rocks."
Murphy, "Iran on the Rocks," p. 100.
views on fundamentalist governments. As a consequence of these differing perceptions, many
questions concerning the direction of Islamic fundamentalism remained unanswered. These
unanswered questions have created economic confusion in Iran today.
This thesis argues that any system of government primarily based on religion is one that
should also provide for the separation of church and state. This separation is important not
only for the economic success of the country but also for the stability of its religious regime.
To illustrate this point this paper looks at the rise of religiously based governments. Despite
some similarities, they include some major deviations in their religious interpretations. This
thesis, then, elaborates on the specifics of Islam, and the unique structures inherent in Islamic
fundamentalism.
Current developmental theory suggests a correlation exists between government
structures and elements of economic stability. While the specific impact of religion and
leadership on these developments may be debated, this thesis argues that there are conclusions
to be drawn. These conclusions suggest the cohesiveness displayed by Iran during their debt
crisis in 1993 was not unique and when necessary, the regime can generate support for extreme
policies. This, in turn, implies that Iranian fundamentalists are likely to demonstrate similar
resolve when faced with their next crisis.
Iran is experiencing a huge increase in the nation's youthful population. Already a
burden for government, as these youths age, they will create an even greater burden for social
welfare programs. The solution to the existing and likely worsening economic stagnation
seems to be a move toward establishing economic stability through market structures of
government. While separation of the institutions of religion and government is desirable in
terms of establishing economic stability, it is not entirely a requisite. A credible move towards
restricting the ruling elite's ability to influence market events at will should suffice to encourage
investors that Iran is on the right track. A firm commitment to the principles of free markets
today, may allow Iran to avoid the potential civil strife associated with a failed economic
system in the future.
Theologians contribute significantly to economic and social chaos. They attempt to
reform government structures according to religious dogma. This thesis argues that a
religiously based government has not much sympathy or understanding of such secular affairs
as economics and law. Only by scientific control of the economy and by encouragement of a
system of law under which a government is held accountable, can the validity of a
fundamentalist society be maintained. It is further argued that the effects of stability and
growth on the economy of a fundamentally based regime will benefit its transition to a market
based structure under a centrally planned system. This transition is both profitable and
important for long term growth in today's global marketplace. To apply the concept of
economic growth as an appropriate measure of economic success is perhaps Western oriented,
but there seems to be no other accessible measure which can be applied across cultural lines
with any hope of measuring the benefits of sound government structures leading to economic
success. Because of the perception ofthe potential impact of Islamic systems, it is important to
understand, Iran, as one of the most influential of the fundamentally based Islamic systems of
government and its potential for success.
Recent developments in theory associated with the structures of government and
growth as applied to Iran will be the subject of this thesis. Application of this theory will
illustrate some strong parallels to be found within fundamentalist systems and provide some
suggestions for the future of these systems in terms of developing separate structures of
government and religion. Finally, conclusions will be drawn in an attempt to form a prediction
for Iranian society. It is hoped that this thesis will provide useful insight to the importance of
the electoral result in Iran, some of the root causes for this significant vote, and what the future
may hold concerning the direction of Iranian society and fundamentalist systems in general.

n. NEW TRADITION BASED ECONOMIES
There is no question that the world is experiencing a rapid growth of organizations
dedicated to establishing social, political and economic systems founded on specific principles
of religion, often refered to as revivalist. While the rise of Islam is perhaps the best known, this
lack of awareness does not slow the world-wide growth of fundamentalist systems based on
Buddhism, Confucian, Hindu, Judaic and Christian principles. 6 These revivalist systems have
been called the "New Traditional Economies" and appeal to a wide range of people for an
equally wide range of reasons. It is argued that while these economies are based on tradition
and principle, they are not in fact merely academic exercises or an attempt to live in the past,
rather that they hold practical answers for real problems.
7
The basis of revivalism does not seem to be the failure of market economics. There are
many examples of nations with strong religious traditions that are very successful both in
domestic and in international trade. Nor is there evidence that modern market economies
Discriminate based solely on religious dogma. Therefore, explanations for the growth in
popularity of these new socio-economic systems must be found somewhere outside of the
immediate realm of trade and market success. In fundamentalist societies, it is traditional
institutions of religious beliefs, customs, and centuries of history that are the bedrock of
society, not social or political theory.
8
The ideals of religious equality and compassion are found in every fundamentalist based
society. Despite these ideals, these societies face significant difficulties. They need to make the
gradual evolution into a technical, materialist society without shedding their essential traditional
and religious cultures. Fundamentalists tend to believe that a religiously oriented system of
6
Rosser, John Barkley, and Marina V. Rosser , eds., "Islamic Economics and the Economics of Other
Religions," in Comparative Economics in a Transforming World Economy, (Irwin, Chicago, 1996) p. 101-
108.
Pfeifer, Karen, "Is there an Islamic Economics?," in Beinin and Stork (eds.), Political Islam, p. 157.
8
Fabricio, Roberto, "Islam Defies Labels as Diversity Spreads Economically, Culturally," Sun-Sentinel, Fort
Lauderdale Fla., April 16, 1995.
government should be able to care for all its citizens and still prosper. This ideal system has yet
to be established. A review of fundamentalist systems codes of conduct and application of
religion seem to bear this out.
A. BUDDHIST
Some Western writers extol the virtue of Buddhist economics and its "detachment
from materialism and mindless economic growth."9 The vision of Buddhism, common in the
West, is one of a society which is harmonious, ecologically friendly, balanced in attitude toward
work and relaxation. This vision may be attractive to many, though closer analysis reveals that
the impact of such a harmonious vision on a world about to enter the twentieth century might
be fraught with cultural shock and technological change.
In industrial China and Japan, which have a large percentage of the Buddhist
population of the world, the societal role of Buddhism tends to be reduced to the passive
support of market forms based on other principles of governance. 10 Nations in South and
South- East Asia like Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand, generally practice a form of Buddhism
as the dominant religion and seem to incorporate some of the principles into their economics.
Laos and Cambodia officially supplant Buddhism with socialist ideology, though Buddhist
influence can be found in local communities. n
An insight into the differences in interpretations of religious text may be illustrated by
review ofone attempt to apply the principles ofBuddhist economics. In Burma, the building of
temples is a means of achieving individual merit. While overtly supporting a "Protestant ethic"
style of motivation for accumulating wealth, success attained morally and within the principles
of religious teachings is valued higher than that achieved materially. Because this wealth was
made while following the precepts ofBuddha, it is sanctified and holy. Ironically the policies of
the Buddhist government concerning the appropriate use of such morally accumulated wealth





effectively dissipated that wealth through poor capital investment activities. This squandering
of capital resources provides little return to the economy while increasing the need for public
and social services for both the religious and secular impoverished by an inefficient economy.
Results from Burma indicate a initial surge in investment generated by increased
construction of temples. This was followed by low economic growth rates due to the non-
capital investment nature of construction of religious shrines. This non-capital producing
investment in turn has stagnated the economy and does not improve the quality of life for the
population in general, though fundamentalist monks are better supported. The combination of
low growth rates, increased expense and little capital return can mean only long term trouble
for the policy and the regime.
B. CONFUCIAN
The writings of Confucius are known throughout the world and are often thought of as
the basis for a kind of philosophy or social influence rather than religion. Confucian values are
unique in this discussion in that there is no major effort leading a call to return to fundamental
interpretation of a text or clerical movement. Rather a call to return to the values of Confucius
and not necessarily to the letter of his text has recently been echoed by many of the "Asian
Tigers." These economies, noted for their rapid growth and ability to capitalize on rapidly
changing circumstances, appear to have positioned themselves to continue into the future with
sustained economic growth and prosperity. While the success of many of these economies is
unassailable, the motivation for the call to return to Confucian values is often based on a desire
to specifically counter the advancement ofWestern style ideals of equality, freedom and pursuit
ofhappiness.
The Confucian values, so important to the leaders of nations as diverse as Singapore,
Taiwan, China, Japan and Korea, include a strong reliance on order, hierarchy, education and
benevolence. Application of the principles ofmarket economics are generally accepted in these
economies although many impose the strong arm of authoritarian structure and governmental
control. Traditionally, Confucian thought emphasized a "hands off' approach to the structure
of markets as long as the leader was perceived to be properly benevolent, reverent and
maintained celestial harmony. This enabled the prevailing government to confirm its authority
and popular sovereignty by dispensing its economic benefits to the successful business
entrepreneurs who in turn benefits the nation by the employment of workers and establishing
efficient structures ofcommerce.
C. HINDU
Mahatama Gandhi was responsible for the concept of independence for India, starting
with his foundation of Hindu economics in "Hind Swaraj" in 1909. Gandhi envisioned a caste
system purged of its worst elements and embracing an idea of self-rule and self-sufficiency at
both the village and the state level.
12 He was able to establish an enduring emphasis on
economic nationalism and self sufficiency. Despite this vision, Gandhi was a traditionalist in
terms of economic policies, opposing industrialization, improved transportation, and
urbanization. In fact, the spinning wheel became the symbol of this movement due to
idealization ofhomespun cloth, indigenous village technology, and the nationalist independence
(swadeshi) that it represented.
Following Gandhi's assassination, his followers moderated their views of Hindu
economics to include less reform of the traditional caste system and greater acceptance of
modem technology. These views were to remain in a decentralized framework as a system of
modern, productive, small scale technologies in self-sufficient villages. This system is proving
effective and India is often used to illustrate the positive effects ofgood economic planning and
policies for the social welfare of a nation. India's successful application of Ghandi's principles
for society, moderated by increased technological development, made for the gradual evolution





Despite strong religious backgrounds and ardent adherence to the principles of Judaism
the state of Israel, like other religious countries in the West is a secular one. The success of
Judaic economics with its strong foundation in the Torah, should not be ignored. These
elements include a list of specific injunctions concerning economic behavior, private property,
and management of markets, which is not dissimilar to other religious based fundamentalist
systems.
A distinguishing feature of the Judaic system is the strength of its institutions in terms
of balancing radical and conservative elements of society. When religious values come into
direct conflict with economic interests, a prohibitive mandate is not issued from the religious
concerned. Rather the issue is resolved by mutual discussion by concerned governmental and
religious groups.
The recent sale of the national airline clearly illustrates the effectiveness of this process.
The issue at the heart of this sale concerned the appropriateness of the state of Israel to
mandate work on the Sabbath. Due to scheduling requirements and differences in time zones,
some of the air lines operations were conducted on the Sabbath. Meeting international
business requirements imposed by the global nature of air travel were interpreted by some as a
violation of the sanctity of the day. Though this linkage was distant and clearly beyond the
direct control of the state, religious elements succeeded in pressuring the government to sell the
airline.
Despite the political significance of this sale, fundamentalist religious elements
effectively dictating governmental actions, there were no major changes in the stated goals of
the government. There were no new policies which might impact operations of other segments
of the economy. In general, there was little which might tend to scare off investors.
Established structures in Israel allowed this decision to occur within the existing framework, so
there were few opportunities for investors to develop perceptions of a lack of stability. Fixed
rules, open discussions and opposition, little or no impact on other sectors of the economy, this
is practically a "text book" example of how a fundamentalist based regime should conduct
business.
The benefit of developing these kinds of structures is readily apparent with a brief
review of investment in Israel. During 1991-1995 investments in permanent assets rose an
average of 13.5% a year. 13 Foreign direct investment in Israel rose from $81 million in 1990,
to more than $2 billion in 1995. 14 Statistics from the National Authority for Economic
Planning indicate an expectation of continued growth in the business sector's excess capital at
more than 8% per annum through the end of the century. 15 This projected growth indicates
that Judaic economic structures aptly demonstrate the ability of a system to incorporate radical
fundamentalist elements while generating the economic benefits of relative stability.
E. CHRISTIAN
When dealing with the term "Christian" one must remember that it incorporates
different branches of Christianity to include Catholicism and Protestantism. Both have factions
which maintain differing views on the acceptability of market based economics as they exist
today. The Catholic Church, while critical of excessive materialism and a lack of compassion
for the poor, is generally thought of as pro-market. The Protestant church is linked even more
closely with market capitalism both socially and ideologically. 16 Max Weber argued that "the
Protestant ethic is the spirit of capitalism" due to early cooperation between the church and
fledgling market institutions of capitalism.
While the two major representatives of Christian values are generally pro-market, there
are a number of splinter groups which are not so benevolent towards the market. Differing
intellectual views between some Catholic movements and also between a number of Protestant
1
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Rosser and Rosser, "Islamic Economics," p. 107.
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organizations make it difficult to pull together a cohesive statement concerning Christian
economics. For example:
"Strict" fundamentalists avoid discussion on politics and economics because they tend
to distract from the immediate discussion of personal salvation.
The "New Christian Right" fundamentalists, often associated with Pat Robertson and
Jerry Falwell, tend to be avidly pro-market.
"Christian Reconstructionists" tend to be more moderate theologically, but maintain
radical libertarian economic views. 17
The "Evangelical Left" in comparison, tends to support major government income
redistribution, national food policies and guaranteed wages. 18
"Radical Evangelicalism" represents the advocates of full blown socialism and the
attendant government responsibility.
The breadth of differing views among these Christian groups, plus the variety in views
of mainline Catholic and Protestant groups, make the true nature of Christian economics




A quick glance at the size of the Islamic world shows that with a population of some
1.6 billion and projections to exceed 2.0 billion by the year 2050, it represents the religious
well-being of a large number of people. The core of the "Islamic Crescent," containing some
32 nations, is in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region. Beyond the Crescent, Islam has been
accepted as a dominant form of religion in nations as diverse as Sudan, Malaysia, Morocco,
Nigeria and Tajikistan.
17
North, Gary, Inherit the Earth: Biblical Principlesfor Economics, (Dominion Press, Fort Worth, 1987).
18
Sider, Ronald, Rich Christians in an Age ofHunger, (Intervarsity Press, Downer's Grove, 111., 1977).
19
Rosser and Rosser, "Islamic Economics," p. 107.
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As a religiously based system, Islam requires some flexibility to adapt to cultural
differences, local practice and influences. There is little denial that the foundations of Islam
provide this flexibility even though perceptions in the West often discount the potential of this
positive aspect of Islam. Recent popularity of Islam as a foundation for a political system
stems from several diverse issues concerning national identity, anti-colonialism, oil, and
nostalgic remembrances of "Islam's glorious past".
Before delving into discussion of the general principles of Islam, it is worthwhile to
note that the two main branches of Islam are that of the Shia and the Sunni. While both
branches are found in Iran, the Shia branch is dominant.
20
While the principles of Islam remain
fixed, application and interpretation of these principles vary significantly. Their interpretation is
based on the dominant sect in the country and is important to our discussion because these
differences greatly affect the structures ofgovernment in the respective nations.
21
2. POPULATION
The population of Iran has grown from 37 million in 1979 to over 64 million in 1995. 22
While over 45 percent of the population is under 14 years old and there are about 7.5 million
would be students in the age range from 13 to 17. This huge number of teens and preteens,
combined with a increased trend of movement from rural areas to the cities and a falling per
capita income points towards a catastrophic problem for the regime. 23 This paper contends
that this population crisis may lead to yet another consolidation of consensus in the halls of
power, not dissimilar to the consensus brought about by the debt crisis of 1993.
Viorst, "Limits ofthe Revolution," p. 67, see also Fabricio, Roberto, "Islam Defies Labels as Diversity
Spreads Economically, Culturally," Sun-Sentinel, (Fort Lauderdale Fla., April 16, 1995).
21
Fabricio, "Islam Defies Labels."
22
23
Wright, "The Revolution Unravels," p. 1.
Murphy, "Iran on the Rocks," p. 100.
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This population crisis which many believe could prove to be the undoing of the regime
is, in the opinion of this thesis, more likely to facilitate either a shift towards market oriented
structures or retreat towards a radical socialist model.
3. FUNDAMENTALISM AND ECONOMY
The appeal of fundamentalist Islam is not only that it provides a set of moral codes by
which to live, but that it also offers a system of economic and political organization of
society.
24
This organization is distinct from both socialism and capitalism which are often
considered the defining points of economic systems. As this paper has shown the realm of the
new traditional economies present several options for development of economic systems
though the "third way" presented by the Islamists seems the most fully developed.25 As an
alternative development strategy, some within Islam would like to successfully deal with the
problems of both capitalism and socialism, while relying exclusively on neither. 26 This would
be accomplished by adapting relevant principles of either system to a framework based on
Islam.
An aim of establishing such a system of government would be to encompass
competition within a socially responsible framework without losing the responsiveness of the
markets.
27
In theory, from this framework a system of neither free trade nor autocratic
protectionism, but "managed" competition would emerge.
28
This framework proposed by
Islamic thinkers is not conceptually far from recent economic theory on the structures of
government and growth. Major differences are found in the complete reliance on government
structures rather than market forces to ensure a sound economy. Islamic government
24
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structures are supposed to ensure adherence to the theological precepts of Islam, which it is
argued, will then ensure success ofthe system.
29
A point that most theorists tend to miss is that instead of looking like neither capitalism
or socialism, an Islamic "third way" would tend to look like a combination of both. As we
know, the structures of government incorporated into capitalism and socialism are not unique
or distinctive. In some cases, the difference is only the political affiliation of the elected
leadership. A significant problem in the potential success of Islamic economics as well as
other fundamental economic systems, is the fact that much of the text on which the economic
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Though there are many unifying elements in Islam, it is fair to say that implementation
in terms of the structures of government varies greatly. This is in spite of universally accepted
principles which provide general guidance for followers. Three broad principles, Tawhid,
Kahilafah and Adalah, are further elaborated upon by six specific injunctions which arise and
are interpreted from four general sources. A brief discussion of the meaning and importance of
these elements is presented below.
Islam includes the notion of 'Tawhid" or the singularity of God. In addition to
indicating the "oneness" of God, it has also been interpreted as the unity of God and creation,
which is the manifestation of God's power in the universe. 31 Some populist advocates extend
the domain of Tawhid to social and economic phenomenon by arguing that the unity of God
and creation also means equality of all men in the society. This is often where some scholars of
Islam and advocates of socialism join paths.32 Khilafah or vice-regency, implies that humans
operate as partners of Allah in the management of the world and its resources. This further
implies universal brotherhood, a concept stressed frequently in the Koran and the Hadith.
Adalah or justice, implies concern for the welfare of others and establishes cooperation as a
basic principle of economic organization.
34
Specific injunctions which dictate compliance to a fundamentalist Islamic system of
economics include the principles of Zakat (alms giving), Riba (the prohibition on interest),
31
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Qirad (profit sharing), and Gharar (the avoidance of chance). Proper consumption, hard work
and fair dealings are the last two major injunctions. 35
Part of the difficulty in establishing a uniform code from which to enforce these
injunctions is apparent just in the descriptions of each injunction. What is proper consumption?
Does it vary with socio-economic status? How about availability? How hard is hard work? Is
the degree of difficulty measured in calories burned per day, such that a day laborer is working
harder than an mechanical engineer? If chance is to be avoided can there be risk takers? Can
new ideas and products be brought to market? The theological questions are many and
answers usually begin with, 'It depends" .
While the application of the general principles transcend national borders, they are
found in one form or another in all Islamic based economic systems. Despite the near universal
presence of these principles, like interpretation of Shari'a, implementation and penalties for
noncompliance vary significantly. Variations in the frequency of enforcement and severity of
penalty, extend into many other areas of the structures of Islamic systems and contribute to the
apparent lack of overall success for the revolution in Iran.
B. LAW
There are four sources of Islamic laws. The Koran is the first and most important for all
Muslims. The second source of Islamic law, the Sunna, is based on the Hadith or the record
that Muslims follow to learn about the practices of the Prophet. 36 The Sunna itself describes
the tradition ofthe Prophet Mohammed his words and statements, acts and customs.
The third source of Islamic laws is Ijma. This constitutes legal issues on which Muslim
jurists have reached consensus during a specific period oftime.
37 We would use the concept of
See 'Islamic Economics and the Economics of other Religions ," in Comparative Economics in a
Transforming WorldEconomy, , eds. J.B. Rosser and M.V. Rosser (Irwin, Chicago, 111., 1996) Chap. 5, pp.
101-124. See also Muhammed Nejatullah Siddiqi, 'Muslim Economic Thinking: A Survey of
Contemporary Literature," in Studies in Islamic Economics, ed. K. Ahmad (Islamic Foundation, Leicester,
1980) p. 191-315.
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case law. Ijma is a complementary problem-solving tool to supplement provisions in the Koran
and the Sunna. Modern jurists view Ijma as the mechanism to adapt Islamic laws to changing
conditions and an evolving society. The Ijma serves to keep the Shari'a applicable to changes
and developments without undermining the fundamental divine basis. 39
The forth source of Islamic law is the Shari'a. It is to direct men along the proper path.
Revealed to the Prophet Mohammad as the proper code of conduct, it constitutes the
commands of God and, therefore, is not subject to human reason or interference. Shari'a is
intended to provide society with a collection of laws. Compliance to these laws establishes the
Islamic sovereignty of a state.
The interpretation of Islamic law which declares man unable to interpret God's word or
the Shari'a is a area of some concern to Islamic theologians. Strict application of this
interpretation would tend to deprive the clerics of their exhaulted and sometimes claimed divine
inspiration in terms of establishing conditions for man's salvation. While this concern is of
varying importance in different nations, it does point once again to the problems inherent when
fundamentalist religious texts are used to govern.
Returning briefly to the concept of Shari'a, there are different interpretations of Shari'a
followed by different nations. These interpretations vary based on the influence of the
dominant Islamic sect and the religious scholars within that sect. Though placing emphasis on
different issues, they are in fact establishing Shari'a and adherence constitutes an Islamic state.
These differences become structural in nature and reach beyond the mosque into the
government where most long term economic problems appear to reside.
C. BANKING
Attempts to apply the principles of Islam to the management of economy are not new
in the Islamic world.
40






As Behdad [1989] and Rahnema and Nomani [1990] have noted, the so-called Islamic economics is an
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practiced today in Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Egypt. 41
The recurring problem with successful implementation of Islamic banking concerns interest.
There are interpretations of the Koran which completely forbid the concept of interest.
Though as in everything with an interpretation, there are others which suggest that the intent is
not the elimination of interest, rather the avoidance ofusury or excessive interest.
The debate over interest aside, Islamic banks need to make money for their investors or
they do not remain in business. It is without consequence to the economic system if this profit
is made through the rental of capital, or some other form of profit sharing rather than
traditional forms of interest. The reality of the situation remains firmly rooted in the concept of
accepting a profit for taking a risk. If a system develops other ways to describe this basic
premise of investing, it does nothing to change the fact that investors crave stability and
returns. Any system which can provide these two critical items will succeed.
The first experience in the era of international corporations and global communication
was in Egypt in 1964 with capital supplied by West German banks. 42 The idea was initially
supported by the Egyptian government, however, the expansion of Islamic banks came to a
halt when political considerations ended support. 43 In Pakistan, during the presidency of Zia
Al- Haq, Islamization of the entire banking system was suggested, but in practice, complete
Islamization was narrowed to the creation of Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) accounts offered in
conjunction with conventional interest-bearing financial transactions.44
eclectic combination of Islamic ethics and neoclassical theories ofthe capitalist welfare state. "This body of
literature has increasingly become more sophisticated both in terms of its methodological approach and its
theoretical complexity."
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D. PRIVATE PROPERTY
Conflicting views of liberal and radical fundamentalists on the limits of private property
and the role of the state in an fundamentalist economy conspire to undermine the formation of
coherent economic policies in Islamic societies, including post-revolutionary Iran. 45 In general,
it is considered structurally important to have established guidelines for the possession,
acquisition and disposal of private property. Only through uniform application of this concept
of private property can an economic system move towards establishment of markets. Markets
require stability, predictability, credibility, and good structures of governance, in order to
generate growth which is critical to social development.
E. PATRIACHAL SYSTEMS
Patriarchal systems of government are hardly new to the scene, from the earliest days
of history being a relative or descendant of the leader has frequently allowed significant
advantages. Often times legitimacy for this authority is tied to a religious mandate. Patrimony
is represented in a social organization reckoning decent from the male line of elders,
empowered to perform the ordinances of a religion. To further clarify, patriarchal systems are
similar to centrally planned systems in that the ruler, or ruling body, has essentially unlimited
discretion in terms of choosing or altering a course of action.
46
Reliance on the unlimited
authority ofthe leader bases the system on personal trust. The leader can hand out monopolies
in property ownership, production, trade, etc.
47
Since the decisions of the ruler are the sole
basis of legitimacy and direction of this system, there can never be complete investor












The general nature of fundamentalist systems is so similar as to be interchangeable with
the patriarchal system with the following exception. The individual patriarch is replaced with a
group which functions as the patriarch in the fundamentalist system. This correlation between
patriarchal and fundamentalist systems is further illustrated by the method in which
fundamentalist systems maintain their position and autonomy in the structures of government.
By maintaining superior knowledge of the theological questions of the particular fundamentalist
systems, the clerics can evade imposition of enforceable rules by claiming that they rely on God
for direction, and that there is no man who can claim to subject the word of God to human
rules. Since they represent the message of God, they argue that they too cannot be subject to
man's rules.
A problem may be that to subject themselves, the ruling clerics, to the rule of law has
theological ramifications which they may not be able to reconcile. Through the linkage of
authority and theological righteousness, the clerics in fundamentalist based systems have placed
themselves in a precarious position. The unstable nature of their position is due to the inherent
unsuitability of interpretive meanings of ancient texts for governing modern society. To clarify,
if the interpretation of religious text changes, it could then change interpretation of religious
law, which would alter the governmental structure. A change in the foundation of government
could land those in power prior to such a change, out ofthe political picture.
F. ISLAMIC SOCIALISM
While some scholars of Islam and advocates of socialism join ranks to embrace the
notion of'Tawhid"or the singularity of God, populist advocates extend the domain of Tawhid
to social and economic phenomenon. This partnership of Islam and socialism is not fixed in
history or tradition. In practice, a historical review of Islamic society and Iran would illustrate
particular adeptness in business and trade.
Today the economic goals of Iran's Shia influenced interpretation of Islam and its goals
concerning economic structures echo those of fundamentalist systems in general. These goals
20
include establishing just prices and wages, ensuring distribution is widespread, limiting windfall
profits of middle men, and adhering to principles of morality as described by their religion.
While the specific note or the goals of the systems may vary, the overriding tenor is a need to
assert or reassert national identity.
Proponents of these fundamentalist systems hold the belief that some cost in terms of
efficiency, growth, and social limitation is acceptable in order to function in a manner that is as
consistent as possible with religious beliefs. A salient problem with this is that religiously
trained elite's, proponents of these systems, do not generally understand market mechanisms or
the importance ofallowing these mechanisms to work. By frequent interventions and revisions
in an attempt to produce desired outcomes, they typically limit investment, growth,
development and economic success.
Discussion of fundamentalist attempts to exercise more influence on social and
economic issues in society leads to the necessity of a review of such practice to evaluate its
success or identify its problems. Naturally, a system with a good record is desirable. Also a
system which has had limited intervention from other forms of governmental and economic
systems during its development would be beneficial. Both of these issues point to the




While Iran may be somewhat of an anomaly in Islam, this does not deter the dominant
Shia religious element from clamoring for leadership in the supposedly destined wave of
Islamic regimes.
4
Iran is trying fulfill its perceived role as the model of a successful Islamic
system in terms of economics, politics, and social structures despite their many problems. 50
After the advent of the Iranian revolution in February 1979, the new Islamic state
launched a comprehensive program designed to apply the concepts of Islamic law directly to
society. While the revolution had no clear specific economic goals, an objective of the
revolution was to establish structures of government required to lay the foundation of an
Islamist economic system in Iran. 51 The uniqueness of the Iranian experience, compared to
earlier efforts to establish fundamental religious economies, was the scope and intensity with
which it was embarked upon. Comprehensive programs directed at all levels of the structure of
Iranian society were established by the revolution to implement and enforce fundamentalist
interpretations of Islamic law.
52
A. GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION
The primary motivation of the revolution, it is fair to generalize, was the religious
perception that society had become Westernized. This shift towards Western values was
perhaps the early movement towards the establishment of a more open market system under
the Shah. However, the clerics found this distasteful because this meant focusing less on
upholding the precepts of Islam than pursuing individual liberties which might include
accumulation of consumer goods.
53
Additionally, the unpopular conduct of the Shah of Iran
49
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provided the necessary figurehead for the revolutionary elements to oppose in order to
generate popular opposition. This opposition would eventually topple the regime.
Implementation of the new Islamic focus on fundamentalist economics included various
programs such as the "Cultural Revolution," "Islamization of the Judicial System" and
"Islamization of the Economy." The later included the application of Islamic law to land
ownership and tenure, banking, labor relations and wages, inheritance, and even foreign
investment.
54
This application of Islam to structures of the economy included the forced
nationalization of critical firms and direct public control over major industries, including
transportation, utilities, oil production, etc. These early goals of the revolution in Iran have
undergone great changes in the intervening 1 8 years. Today structures are little different, and
often perceived as worse then they were prior to the revolution.
55
B. CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS
The structure in Iran following the revolution has placed great power and enormous
wealth in the hands of semi-public charitable foundations. 56 These foundations, called
Bonyads, are set up to operate appropriated business for the benefit of various groups in Iran
which fall under such blanket descriptions as "the oppressed". In practice, though government
owned and under control of the clerics, these Bonyads have come to operate largely outside of
government control and accountable to no one. 57 The largest of these foundations, Bonyad
Mostazafan va Janbazan, "The Foundation for the Oppressed and Injured", has grown to
become 5 times as large as all other foundations combined and the largest conglomerate in the
54
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Currently, Iran has only about 14 percent of its GDP in private control, about 1.5
percent of that is controlled by the Bonyad Mostazafan va Janbazan. 59
What is significant is that Bonyads and other state run banks and industries receive
some 62 per cent of allocated expenditures, while these industries have a reputation for
inefficiency and corruption they, according to President Rafsanjani, "intend to be profitable".60
The mechanism which allows the government to continue these excessive expenditures on
poorly run businesses with little or no motivation to return a profit is a manipulation of
exchange rates. By devaluation of the currency every year and increasing revenues by
domestic sale of part of its "dollar oil revenues" at the official exchange rate of IR. 3000,
revenues can be manipulated to appear to meet expenses. 61
The government of Iran, by encouraging their growth or not moving to control these
foundations, exhibits behavior consistent with a patriarchal system. That is attempting to
stabilize the system by the granting of monopolies.62 By allowing these foundations to
monopolize industries and access "sweetheart" exchange rates, the government has greatly
reduced competition in the limited private sector.
63
Additionally, because fellow clerics are in
control of these foundations, often decisions are often made only to benefit the foundation
rather than the society as a whole.
64
This shortsightedness contributes to the perception of
instability and therefore serves to erode investor confidence, which contributes to a lack of
growth.
In the case of Iran, the clerics do not appear to have an interest in establishing market
structures, since they control a significant share, some 85 percent of the GDP through the
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Bonyads, government run businesses, and banks.
65
They have little desire to limit their ability
to ensure the profitability of these economic units in society. While some may choose to take
the high moral ground in this argument, which is that the proceeds go to assist those in need,
the reality appears to be that continued, random meddling in the economy by implementation of
policies designed to assist these specific elements ofthe economy, significantly deters long term
investment and its attendant growth.
C. IRAN'S SOCIALISM
The manner in which the revolutionary government in Iran moved towards the
accomplishment of their goals was in keeping with a generally socialist framework. Control of
major enterprises with an impact on the public, such as foreign trade, banking, transportation,
and power distribution, was seized by the government for direct control. Other critical firms
were nationalized and placed into foundations for the benefit of the oppressed and
downtrodden in society. Some redistribution of land was initiated though never completed
which was perhaps a pivotal point in a socialist agenda.
The actions of the leaders of the revolution showed a particular level of naivete in
terms of reaching their economic goals of independence from the West: equitable distribution
of wealth and resources, and an improved standard of living. Believing that the moral
superiority of their religious beliefs would provide them the necessary depth of talent to
radically alter the manner in which a nation's economy worked, seemed shortsighted in
retrospect.
In fact, by failing to adopt established systems of government based on the existing
models already described in this thesis, the revolutionaries failed to establish a stable regime by
trial alone. Today finds the existing system of government in Iran continuing with the same
inefficient economy.
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D. PRIVATE PROPERTY IN IRAN
Despite support found in Khomeini's 'A Clarification of Questions ," which provides
the official view on economic policy in Iran, application of the concept of private property
varies. Khomeini is generally moderate in terms of economic views, supporting the notion of
private property, as well as accepting land rents, sharecropping, and insurance. This relatively
principled view ofthe structure of the economic system however, did not prevent the seizure of
property belonging to the former royal family and associates in 1979.
These seizures, despite being contrary to the stated views on property rights, were in
keeping with Khomeini's calls for redistributive justice and denouncement of corruption in the
previous regime. The opportunity to issue economic and social decisions which appeared to
contradict policy interpretations, contributed significantly to problems associated with the
potential success of Islamic economics as practiced in Iran. 66 These conflicting views of liberal
and radical fundamentalists on the limits of private property and the economic role of the state
in the economy contribute to undermine the formation of coherent economic policies in post-
revolutionary Iran.
67
At the heart of the problems in Iran seems to be the lack of understanding of some,
intuitive and academic basics concerning operational concepts of economics and the structures
required to support these systems.
68
Part of the responsibility for this lack of understanding
could likely be attributed to the Iranian perception that the problems of development and
developing economies, and then be directly linked to the West and its expanding, often
overwhelming values through the global internet of communications. 69
66
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This, almost diametric opposition to the importance of a market based structure,
whether based in the West or East, is a major stumbling block for the clerics in Iran. 70 The
leadership of Iran has effectively strangled investment, limited development and modernization,
and delayed the benefits ofeconomic stability to the people of the nation by their apparent push
towards socialism. 71 Socialism or centrally planned economies has the appeal of perceived
equality to fundamentalists. It is the reality of trying to make these systems work which they
find overwhelming.
At this point in the turbulent history of Iran, it is not clear that its leaders have come to
terms with the modern world of instant communication and mass-markets. To achieve this,
they must understand the dynamics of a viable government structure where they can reconcile
with fundamentalist principles oftheir Islamic faith - as indeed some of their regional neighbors
have done.
Though not necessarily the President, see King, A., 'The Revolution that Lost its Fizz ," The Economist, Vol.
319, May 1 1, 1991, p. 38 for a discussion on Rasfanjani's early record in office.
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V. STRUCTURAL THEORY
Structures of government are important to the long term growth of a nation because,
through these structures, a nation may establish a secure environment in which to conduct
business. Conversely by looking at these same structures investors may see signs of
instability and choose not to invest. The long term effects to the nation of both the impression
these structures convey to investors, and also the efficiency and predictability of governmental
actions, are far reaching.
73
The two broadest generalizations that can be made about structures
of government are to classify them as 'good" or 'bad". 74 The former creates an atmosphere
for sustained long-term economic growth, and the latter is associated with inefficiency and
corruption. Conditions of political stability, or expectations of such, tend to decrease risk for
investors, improve the potential for profits, and form a base for economic growth. On the
other hand lack of stability and danger ofwar are a sure recipe for deterring investors. 75
A. STRUCTURES LEADING TOWARDS GROWTH
Efficient law and order as well as macroeconomic and political stability form the core
of these structural elements.
76 Law and order is critical because protecting society from both
domestic racketeering and external threats is a basic function of government. Macro-economic
and political stability allow investors a reasonable expectation of playing under fixed or at
least semi-fixed rules.
77
Finally, though no less important, is the perceived credibility of the
government. If the investor feels as though the government cannot be trusted, then they are
72
Dhonte, Pierre, and Ishan Kapur, 'Towards a Market Economy: Structures of Governance." International
Monetary Fund, WP/97/1 1, December 1996, p. 2.
73
Dhonte, et al. 'Towards a Market Economy," p. 1.
74
Ibid., pp. 9 - 10.
75
Bar El, 'Growth from Peace ," p. 1
.
76




likely to look elsewhere. If a system of governance cannot protect its people from external
threats and the possibility of internal abuses, then it is not likely to attract investors who require
a stable business environment.
78
The importance of good, secure, accountable structures of government can not be
underestimated. Not only is the population directly affected by these structures during their
daily routines, these same governmental actions and policies directly effect domestic and
international trade by indicating an either stable or unstable governmental system.
B. STRUCTURES DETRACTING FROM GROWTH
From an investors viewpoint, the effects of an unsecured environment due to 'bad"
structures of governance fall into two undesirable categories. The first is that they lower the
expected rate of return on investments and, worst case, could lead to a seizure of assets.
Second, dispersion of possible outcomes from investment is increased. This increase in the
breath of possibilities for the results of investing reduces certainty and predictability, reductions
unpopular with investors. Recent research has suggested that these two effects are not
independent, rather they are additive.
79
Increased dispersion of outcomes has an adverse effect
beyond simply lowering expectation of the rate of return. When these negative effects are
balanced against the investors decision to wait, they have the effect of raising the threshold rate
of return required prior to committing to investments in the nation.
80 By increasing
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C CREDIBILITY
Formal integration of the concept of government credibility into economic analysis is a
fairly recent event which was accomplished through the use of game theory. 81 To illustrate, if
player A feels that he is at risk of predatory behavior by player B, he may choose not to invest
and both would be worse offthan if they could agree on limits to B's predatory behavior. This
scenario does not require B to actually follow rules if established, rather that A must believe
that he will. Though, if player B chooses not to follow established guidelines it is likely that A
will withdraw and become suspicious of attempts by B to encourage A's return. 82 So, it is not
enough for a government to propose 'good" policies. The implementation and even proposal
process must be structured in such a manner that investors believe that they are credible.
D. THE TIME CONSISTENCY PROBLEM
In some cases, a situation may arise where a government may have to reconcile a 'time
consistency"problem enroute to establishing credibility. The essence of this problem is that the
passage of time affects the appropriateness of the policy. For example, 'the optimal policy
following the establishment of credibility is not the same as it was prior to establishing
credibility."
8 ! A policy imposed to counter inflation may result in a requirement to then reduce
real wages and cut unemployment. The only way out of this dilemma is for the government to
surrender some discretionary policy making tools and to be subject to binding rules. The
importance of these limitations on government action is that by ensuring predictability of the
actions of governments, investors can be assured of consistency of action, therefore the
security of their investments. Since consistency supposes predictability, both become
important in establishing credibility, and therefore become key issues of economic decision
making.
81







Discussion about credibility, consistency and predictability is directly related to the
ability of a system of government to establish a secure environment. Recent empirical research
clearly points to the influence of economic and political stability on real GDP growth. 84
Research completed by Borner, Brunetti and Weder, points to the dominant factor in
determining the wealth of nations to be the "quality of their institutions and economic
policies"
85
Economists have established methods with which to evaluate economies in terms of
security, security which leads to stability, stability which leads to economic growth. Weber in
1978 used a distinction of patriarchal and bureaucratic based systems.
86
While this distinction
may be blurred in actual practice, it is valuable for this thesis to present a clear vision between
systemic differences in types of structures.
F. RULE OF LAW SYSTEMS
These systems are generally based on stripping the ruler of discretionary powers and
establishing a foundation of law from which the ruler is required to operate. Hayek in 1944
describes the rule of law system: "... this means that government in all its actions is bound by
fixed rules and announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with fair
certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in a given circumstances and to plan
one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge." 8 To the investor this means that the
system of government is interested in establishing a secure environment in which to invest and
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Limiting government's ability to establish economic security by granting monopolies or
otherwise forcing artificial economic or social controls clearly increases predictability of the
system. Further, establishing structures which clearly define limits for the behavior of
patriarchs, either singular as in the case of a monarchy, or plural as seen in the case of Iran,
gives the system structure. This structure when established and enforced will serve to further
improve predictability, which increases credibility and investor confidence, and therefore




Now that we have an understanding of the two general types of economic systems that
exist, we can address the method and importance of transition from one to another. Hopefully,
the desired transition will be from a centrally planned to a market based system. This transition
is not just a move from one structure to the other, or a move from more to less government.
Rather, despite common misperceptions of the inverse linking of a states involvement in the
economic system to the quality of its institutions and economic performance, the goal is to
balance the markets and government. 88 How much government is appropriate? It is accurate
to say that 'better" economic policies are those that limit predation, both public and private,
impartially enforce contracts, and ensure the long-term security of property rights.
A. SOLVING THE TIME CONSISTENCY PROBLEM
There are two driving forces which influence the transition from patriarchal to rules
based systems and they both coincide with an effort to develop individual liberties. The first
challenge is to deal with is the 'time-consistency" problem. In order to solve this problem, the
ruler actually has a vested interest in subjecting himself to the rule of law. By establishing
credible limitations on predatory powers, a ruler both increases predictability and investor
confidence. A great paradox exists in the practice of market system economies due to an
inaccurate perception of the role of government in the system. Rather than the perceived
Ideal" market system in which it is generally accepted that there is little or no government
intervention, in reality, a market system heavily depends on the quality of its institutions.
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B. INDIVIDUALISM AND EQUALITY
The second challenge faced by Islamic patriarchy in transition to a workable democracy
is the ideological push for individualism and social equality to go with it. This ideological
movement emphasizes social equality as a defining social value, one that will become
recognized as information about democratic values becomes more widespread with global
communication ofmodern technology. 91 Previous regime efforts to establish prestige will give
way to the increasing importance of more basic values like infrastructure development and
stable prices. They will take precedence over local, regional, and international quests for
power and the necessity to establish or maintain regime legitimacy.
92 Most structures of
government are established in an attempt to reconcile some of the inherent differences which
exist when a group of people choose to reside together and form a society. Though rarely a
foundation for government, the elimination or lessening of the impact of these societal
differences if often a goal ofgovernment structures.
C. INCOMPATIBLE ELEMENTS
Important elements ofmarket systems which act independently to enforce adherence to
the rule of law include transparency and accountability, both of which are incompatible with
longevity of the patrimonial regime. This incompatibility results in a critical dilemma in the
quest to establish structures leading to the development of market systems. The primary
element of this dilemma is that efforts to establish structures which would limit a regimes'
discretionary power are met with stiffresistance. The transition to a bureaucratic or rule of law
system are antagonistic to existing regimes and often seen as an all or nothing proposition. The
impact of this all or nothing mentality, often found in patriarchal systems, is that rather than
encouraging a system of government which has a vested interest in the health and prosperity of
the economy, it is aggressively opposed. This opposition is founded in the belief that market
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systems would tend to discourage religious values and undermine support for the religious in
the structures ofgovernment.
While it may seem that this occurs predominately in market systems, it is certainly not
exclusive to these systems. Strong opposition, in fact attempts at elimination of religious
influence, even religion itself, has been seen in command or centralized systems. It seems clear
that this argument is more political than factual in terms of establishing structures of
government in fundamentalist systems. The result of this fundamentalist perception concerning
the incompatibility of market systems and religious value, results in a quest for prestige instead
of efficiency. Discussion in patriarchal systems about the importance of establishing effective
controls on government gives way to discussion of religious virtue and its unspoken goal of
maintaining power in the hands of the religious elite.
D. GOVERNANCE
While an educated person surely does not require a definition of government it is
helpful to review the concepts of governance used by two influential organizations when
dealing with this concept. To position the definition of governance away from being simply the
'act ofgoverning" to something more concrete is important in understanding the consequences
of elements of governance in practice. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the
OECD defines governance from a donor perspective as:
. . the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to
the management of its resources for social and economic development.
The Development Assistance Committee further identifies three elements of governance which
can be used to establish the form of government in use when reviewing a specific nation.
These elements include the form of the regime, the process of management of social and
93 OECD, Development Assistance Committee, (DAC ), "Orientations on Participatory Development and Good
Governance," presented in Paris, 1993.
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economic resources, and the capacity of government to formulate and implement its policies.
World Bank literature applies the concept ofgovernance to:
...capture and define the interests of both the World Bank and other
international institutions in the political and institutional factors affecting
structural adjustment. 9
The definitions of governance used by both the World Bank and the OECD indicate
that concepts of governance are applied to situations well beyond direct intervention in
economic activity. The moral neutrality of the concept of governance illustrated by these
working definitions does not create differences in the application of government designed to
meet the common needs of society. While commonality of social value is frequently found to
exist within a concept of governance, there is no specific moral imperative for coexistence in
most economic systems. It is however, a critical element for proponents of 'New Traditional"
economies. The importance of the separation between the concept of governance and
administration of a nation's morality, is found in the realization that there should be a possibility
of establishing a morality neutral system of government. 96 The question of the desirability of
such a system is beyond the scope of this paper.
E. CONSIDERATIONS
By most market definitions 'good" or 'bad" governance is frequently tied to the ability
to support efficient markets, usually within a framework derived from common values.
Representation of particular elements of governance can greatly effect perceptions of the
quality of governance without significantly affecting the nature of the system. Pure market
oriented choices are often moderated by political concerns of the policy makers. This political
shading does not escape fundamentalist based systems. It seems that even those next to the
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seats ofpower need to rely on the subtlety of political maneuvering. Issues affecting efficiency
and long term growth ofthe economy include topics like the protection of the less fortunate in
society, the need to placate constituents, the maintenance of subsidy payments, repayment of
international loans, and other deliberate policy choices made by any government. It appears
that a foundation of strict religious belief does not excuse the echelons of government from
making these often hard choices.
This point, while perhaps obvious to the casual observer, that government must be
responsible for reconciling societal needs and economic realities, becomes critical to
fundamentalist systems when applied to the roles of religion in society. It seems impossible to
reconcile the difficult economic choices ofgovernments and strict adherence to the precepts of
religious fundamentalism.
97
For with every economic choice comes an economic winner and a
loser. Deciding who these members of a society should be is almost certainly better left to
those who do not claim responsibility for providing moral direction and professing complete
concern for the well being of man.
To further clarify this point, if religion is to be pure and unhindered by political
considerations, that is, free to tend to men's souls without being responsible for their economic
status, then it seems clear that the structures of government and religion should be separate.
98
This is not to say that the structures of government cannot be based on the ideals of religion,
simply that along with the establishment of such structures should come enforceable rules
which then limit the ability of those responsible for defining the structure from applying further
influence." This limiting of the application of influence is directly related to creation (of the
perception) of stability in a regime.
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While the capacity to ensure economic security is clearly an element of '£ood"
governance and a primary element of this paper, the core ofgood governance is really a system
where the elements of the rule of law (system) hold true. By establishing these elements as
indicators of effective government, then potential conflict with the very fabric of the regime can
be avoided. 101 By limiting the scope of economic evaluation to elements of the form of the
regime, determination of effectiveness and policy judgments can be based on the relative
simplicity ofthe efficiency of markets rather than 'complex and insoluble issues of comparative
moral superiority." 102 Avoiding this moral conflict would negate the importance of a call for
fundamental changes in the social fabric of society. Once the mantle of morality is removed
from what should be economic choices, threats to the foundation of religious fundamentalists
are mitigated. By reducing these threats, structures conducive to a rule of law or bureaucratic
system may be established. 103
F. CORRUPTION
Corruption and 'bad" governance are often associated, and while corruption is
generally bad, the identification and separation of the two is somewhat more complex. In the
broadest sense, both corruption and bad governance represent a deviation from the norm. The
difference between the two lies in interpretation of the breadth of wrong doing. Corruption is
thought of as an individual's failings, whereas bad structures of governance imply a systemic
problem. Differentiation between these oft associated ideas provides two benefits. First of all,
by accurately identifying problems, then errors in prescription can be avoided. Secondly, by
pointing out differences in the costs imposed on society by either corruption or bad structures
governance, it becomes clear that structural elements are much more important in terms of
growth.
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Corruption is seen to act more like a tax, a cost incurred to conduct business passed on
to consumers while supporting some level of bureaucracy, legitimate or not. While corruption
is perceived as a local problem, the reality may be that governmental structure is responsible for
existence of the problem in the first place. 104 This then implies that corruption is illustrative of
bad structures of government. While this is not always true on an individual basis, it seems
reasonable to associate rampant corruption in a society with bad structures of governance. It
has been said that corruption 'is an individual's way around a distrust ofgovernment." 105
The lack of certainty in governmental actions and actors implied by bad structures of
government increases investor uncertainty, and thereby reduces stability and economic security.
Investors seem to accept that corruption exists and are somewhat willing to absorb the costs if
the cost remains constant and predictable. Rapid, often unpredictable governmental actions,
however, hold potentially greater costs and investors are less willing to endure these kinds of
uncertainties. Attendant consequences ofbad structures of governance, reduced certainty and
decreased investor confidence, are not necessarily seen when analyzing corruption. Corruption
is not inextricably linked to bad structures though it appeals to common sense to anticipate an
increase in corruption when in the presence ofbad structures ofgovernment.
It may appear that this is demonstrably untrue using the example of the U.S.
government. The Constitution is one of the great documents of equality and justice in the
world but the U.S. government is not free from stupendous corruption. This can be reconciled
by application of the very nature of the argument of this thesis that it is the structures of
government that are influential in determination of effectiveness of the system, not the
foundation of the system itself. To further clarify following this line of thought, one would not
argue to rewrite the Constitution to eliminate corruption in the current structures of U.S.
government, rather one would attempt to either increase or decrease the level of governmental
involvement to find a suitable point from which to operate with minimal corruption and waste.
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The correlation to the case of Iran is unmistakable, one would not suggest rewriting the Koran
to solve current social and economic problems, rather one would attempt to change existing
structures in order to more efficiently meet the direction provided in the sacred text.
G. PRIORITY ISSUES
The importance of this discussion is not so much in the value of identification of
corruption or poor structures of governance, rather to point out topics of immediate priority in
addressing economic security. By limiting evaluative focus to these two critical issues,
identifying bad structures and establishing priorities, a constructive path towards a market
economy can be established without curing all the social ills and theological differences in a
society. It seems obvious that a system with a strong basis in fundamentalist religious values
stands to benefit greatly from adopting a similar limited, progressive focus in its approach to
economic security and growth.
H. TRANSITION
Transition to a market based economy is a dynamic process rather than an all or
nothing proposition. In the course of resolution of this process there exists a multitude of
specific economic, social, and political choices which must be undertaken to achieve the goal of
economic security. While each system of government will make choices based on historical,
religious, social and hopefully economic experience, there are several elements which have
proven successful and seem to withstand variance in implementation. These elements include
establishment of a structure which has a vested interest in the success of the economy,
development of institutions to limit governments discretionary powers, establishment and
maintenance of credit-worthiness, and avoiding linkage between the development of market
based economic security and general social change.
Through application of the above principles with their demonstrated effectiveness in
establishing market based economies, the goal ofeconomic security can or should be able to be
established. Once this journey has been completed, or rather embarked on with clear
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dedication to the principles required for its success, the question of the goals of economic
stability can be addressed. In general this paper accepts the notion that real economic success
can be measured in terms of growth. Only through growth or improvements in efficiency can




The idea that an economic system needs growth to remain or establish itself as
successful may seem intuitive to many who live under rule of law systems. Expanding
populations, decreasing resources, improved technology and more competitive markets, all
point to the necessity for improved social systems facilitated by economic growth. It is only
recently that economists have revisited the question of the nature of long term economic
growth. The importance of growth is that it is the 'fundamental determinant" ofw hether our
children and grandchildren will have better lives and if the world's poor will ascend the
economic ladder to move closer to levels of the rich. 106 While some may suggest that growth
must be limited to allow room for the youth of the world, they hold no answers for
reconciliation of the pressures of increasing social requirements driven by increasing
populations. It seems clear that improvements in efficiency manifest as economic growth are
the road to success.
Additionally, accurate models about the influence of growth on an economic system
can be used to formulate sound economic policies which should lead to successful participation
in international markets. This success in international markets combined with the institutions of
government which facilitate success should result in an improved distribution of resources and
an improved quality of life for many.
A. SOLOW GROWTH MODEL
The two basic categories of economic growth theory include a traditional model
designed in 1956 by Robert Solow, and a model of endogenous growth designed in 1986 by
Paul Romer.
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The Solow model 'emphasizes capital accumulation and exogenous rates of
change in population and technological progress." This traditional model argues that all market
106
Gould, David M., Ruffin, Roy J., 'What Determines Economic Growth ," in Economic Review - Second




based economies will eventually reach the same constant growth rate if they have the same
rates oftechnological progress and population growth. Thirty years later, Romer observed that
contrary to theoretical explanation, countries, in fact, appear to have accelerating growth rates
and these rates differ greatly between countries. From Romer's observations developed the
field of endogenous growth, or the idea that long term growth is determined by economic
incentive.
The importance of being aware of the implications of these two very different models
of growth is founded in the realization that the implied prescriptions for achieving long-term
growth are significantly different for each model. By subscribing to one or the other, critical
social choices with direct and indirect long term economic consequences are influenced.
Without going into a full illustration of both models it is appropriate to briefly review the
working points and implied outcomes of each.
B. DIMINISHING MARGINAL RETURNS
The Solow model predicts that the rate of growth of the economy in the long run
simply equals the rate of growth in the labor force plus the rate of exogenously determined
technological progress.
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Solow believed that the production function represented constant
returns to scale. A doubling of input would result in the doubling of output. However, if one
input was held constant, then the doubling of the other would produce less than doubling
returns. This is the foundation of the law of diminishing marginal returns, a distinct element of
the Solow model.
C. INCOME CONVERGENCE
The Solow model, if accurate, implies good news for developing countries. This
model suggests that differences in rates ofgrowth between developing and developed countries




is defined as the time when capital stock and level of output are rising at the same rate that the
population is growing. In theory, rich countries should grow at a slower pace than poor ones
and eventually per capita incomes should converge.
Another assumption ofthe Solow is the idea that investment in improvements in human
capital (accumulated human knowledge) does not increase growth in the long run. This is
because, according to Solow, technological progress does not depend on the presence of a
skilled work force. Rather, income will rise with the level of physical or human capital but the
increase is not self-sustaining. This implies that there is not a correlation between rates of
growth and investment in education, a concept difficult to accept in today's technologically
oriented markets. This effect of short term improvement is due to an increase in a factor of
production and is mirrored in theory concerning the rates of savings. An increase in the rate of
savings will affect only GDP and not the long term rate of growth. Saving rate increases will
spur a short term increase in the rate of growth due to capital accumulation and increased
productivity. However, this short term increase will settle out to equal the rate of change in the
labor force plus the rate of technological progress.
These assumptions raise the question of the ability of poor or slow growth country
governments to survive until this convergence occurs. If, as Solow predicts, rates of
technological change are beyond the influence of governments and improvements in human
capital are not able to fuel increasing rates of technological change, then developing nations
should be able to invest in areas unrelated to human capital and achieve rates of growth similar
to those nations which choose to make this investment. While this has not yet been borne out
by statistical evidence, proponents argue that due to similarities found in the hypothesized
initial effects of both models, that time will deliver the necessary evidence. Opponents
however, contend that the Solow model suffers from its assumptions that technological




D. ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL
Romer's advances in the field of endogenous growth has produced a theory of
economic growth based on the idea that technological progress is driven by economic
incentives. Inventions are not the results of pure disinterested scientists operating outside the
profit motive. Rather, they are intentional and generate technological spill overs which then
contribute to the acceleration of growth by lowering the costs of future innovations.
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The
acceleration of the rate of technological growth postulated by Romer seems to be bom out by
even casual observations of developed economies.
What is not as apparent is the realization that application of the Solow model will
produce the same or similar effects in the short term. Only when technological progress can be
measured will any differences be quantifiable and borne out by statistical review. Measuring of
technological progress may require between five and one hundred years depending on which
model is used for analysis. Because of the possibility of diminishing marginal returns which
allow for an initial surge followed by converging rates of growth, proponents of the Solow
model can justify their positions and claim that history will prove them accurate. This paper
agrees with proponents of Romer's work and the implication that investment in human capital
will provide an accelerating rate ofgrowth.
Recent work in the field of endogenous growth speculates a direct correlation between
increased human knowledge and the rate of technological progress. This correlation produces
a self sustaining relationship in which the cost of innovation falls as levels of knowledge
increase. In this model there is no diminishing return effects on the rate of capital when other
factors ofproduction are held constant. This suggests that increased levels of capital will result
in increasing rates of growth. So, rates of growth will always be faster among nations which
have a large stock of capital, a large educated population or an environment which is favorable
to the accumulation ofknowledge. The impact of endogenous growth theory to the discussion




the structure and policies of the economic system rather than exogenous forces of luck and
nature as implied by Solow.
E. DETERMINANTS OF GROWTH
It is generally accepted that growth is influenced by investment in capital, political and
governmental structures, and the trade policy of the country under review. While the impact or
relative importance of the component elements of the determinants of growth may be debated
there is much less discussion about the composition of these factors. Capital investment must
be both physical and intellectual. In terms of government structures this thesis is dealing with
the stability and openness of the structures. Trade policies may be viewed from the
perspectives of either protectionism or free trade.
The definitive road to enhanced growth has not yet been fully mapped, though
materials which seem to positively contribute to long term growth include schooling and
investment in education,
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capital savings and investment, 112 equipment investment, 113 and the
level of human capital. 1 14 Societal and economic choices which seem to hinder long term
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Vffl. STRUCTURES EN IRAN
It is now time to re-focus to Iran. There has been some measurable impact of U.S.
policy on the economic situation in Iran. Rather than discussing the appropriateness,
effectiveness, or desirability of the status quo, this paper will attempt to identify the potential
for stability based on existing structures of government. It seems that if the theory about
structures of government leading towards growth is correct, then evaluation of the credibility,
predictability, and structures existing in Iran today can be undertaken with a reasonable chance
of constructive output.
A. EROSION OF SUPPORT
Following the revolution in Iran the structures of government were given a strong
Islamic flavor by the new regime. Despite initial popular support for the basis of the regime
change, many believe that conditions were better under the previous regime lead by the U.S.
supported Shah of Iran. The decline in popular support for the hardships required by the
fundamentalist regime are based on the populations perception that the revolutionary regime
has mismanaged their responsibilities. 119 Through encouragement of heavy handed
enforcement of fundamentalist created injunctions, a declining standard of living which is
impacting the middle class, and the inability to maintain popular social programs, support for
the effort has been eroded. 120
This erosion of popular support illustrates a paradox common to repressive regimes,
this is that every regime requires some level of public support for its policies, popular or not.
Maintenance of the structures of government can not be accomplished by only implementing a
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policy of elimination of opposition, a tactic common to regimes attempting to shore up bad
structures of government. Attempts to shore up bad structures by eliminating opposition
through the application of heavy handed tactics is counterproductive to what should be the
goal of the regime, that is embarking on the path towards developing good structures. The
fragmented nature of the political structure and the elite has consistently hindered Iran's ability
to formulate and implement effective policy.
121
However, this has not deterred the clerics from
their practice of continuing their choke hold on the economy.
B. CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS
The structure in Iran following the revolution has placed great power and enormous
wealth in the hands of semi-public charitable foundations. 122 These foundations, called
Bonyads, are set up to operate appropriated business for the benefit of various groups in Iran
which fall under such blanket descriptions as 'the oppressed" . In practice, though government
owned and under control of the clerics, these Bonyads have come to operate largely outside of
government control and accountable to no one. 123 The largest of these foundations, 'The
Foundation for the Oppressed and Injured" has grown to become 5 times as large as all other
foundations combined and the largest conglomerate in the Mid-East. 124 Currently, Iran has
only about 14 percent of its GDP in private control. About 1.5 percent of GDP is controlled
by the "Bonyad Mostazafan va Janbazan." 125
What is significant is that Bonyads and other state run banks and industries receive
some 62 per cent of allocated expenditures, while these industries have a reputation for
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inefficiency and corruption they, according to President Rafsanjani, Intend to be profitable". 126
The mechanism which allows the government to continue these excessive expenditures on
poorly run businesses with little or no motivation to return a profit is a manipulation of
exchange rates. By devaluation of the currency every year and increasing revenues by
domestic sale of part of its 'dollar oil revenues" at the official exchange rate of IR. 3000,
revenues can be manipulated to appear to meet expenses. 127 These domestic currency sales are
made to primarily to state industries and then to domestic traders who can show a need for
foreign currency.
C. INEFFICIENCY AND CORRUPTION
The impact of the inefficiency of Iran's government can not be understated. The level
of involvement of government structures in the daily existence of the population is extensive
and largely unwanted. 128 As some 86 percent of the GDP is achieved through government run
business the economic impact is also severe. 129 The inefficiency of government structures in
terms of running businesses, fuels existing problems with inflation, which ranges between 40 to
200 percent on some basic items. 130 This economic chaos created by conflicting government
policies, combined with a lack of competent managers and underworked, underpaid
employees, acts to disenfranchise the middle class population. This segment of society which
should represent the foundation from which to support the economy and the fundamentalist
government, becomes one of its largest threats and burdens. 131
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As noted above, these changes are often associated with a need to establish or expand
individual liberties. These liberties are frequently articulated by the young.
13
' Iran certainly has
plenty of youth, and while the mantel of religion may placate them for some time, they will
begin to ask questions and seek answers.
133
If the structures of government do not or can not
provide these answers, not only in terms of theology and ideology but also jobs, homes,
families and generally improving standards of living, they will look elsewhere for the answers
while holding those who failed them accountable. 134
D. THE EFFECT ON PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
To cover the loses from inefficient regime run businesses, government simply sets
artificial limits on prices, prints more money, and requires businesses to raise salaries.
135 To
protect ineffective workers from separation, the government makes it virtually impossible to lay
off workers to compensate for increased efficiency. There is little motivation for managers to
find ways to streamline processes and increase profits. According to an official in Iran's Plan
and Budget Organization, some 24 percent of the workforce could be laid off with no change
in the GDP. 136 The sliver of GDP left to private business, despite President Rafsanjani's
pragmatic attempts at privatization, is burdened with the arbitrary nature of the tightly
controlled central bank and government agency policies. 137 Frequent changes without cohesive
direction have resulted in the growth of unchecked bribery and corruption. 138 This corruption
is fueled by business people who desire to achieve some level of stability in order to track their
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these business people hope to stay abreast with the rate of policy change generated by the
ineffective government structures
This is likely a case where structures of the government are as responsible for the
existence of corruption as the individuals themselves. An environment in which corruption and
bribery would be effective is often found in systems lacking accountability and strict controls to
prevent these actions. Leaving decisions concerning the limits of private business operation
to local ministers may actually condone an environment in which these elements of bad
structures of government can flourish. Superficially, this seems to indicate a decentralized
structure due to the lack of specific controls. Realistically, by preventing establishment of a
unified structure for these kinds of decisions, corruption in encouraged. This is not to imply
that every individual engaged in these acts of corruption is of evil intent. Rather, due to
inefficient channels of communication, a lack of clear policy direction, and a desire to make
ends meet, these local officials are able to both benefit the regime and themselves.
Additionally, corruption provides an attractive avenue serving to entrench these local policy
makers in the decision making process.
E. DEBT, UNITY, CONSENSUS
One area in which the usually divided government has reached agreement is on the
importance of reducing the nation's debt. On reaching this agreement the debt has been
refinanced and restructured from short to long and medium term notes which are being repaid
in 'textbook fashion "
140 The commitment to achieving the goals generated by this unusual
consensus is so imbedded in the thinking of the regime that economic decisions in the nation
are dedicated to debt repayment.
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The importance of this somewhat rare example of consensus in the Iranian leadership,
is to illustrate the ability to make effective, radical changes to in order to meet national goals.
Further this example of consensus indicates that while consensus may be difficult to achieve,
once established it does become unifying for the leadership. The response of the government
when faced with the realization of the magnitude of the debt crisis is telling. In 1993, Iran was
about $14 billion behind on payments on its $32 billion debt. 142 With extraordinary zeal and in
the face of US opposition, the central bank and government officials struggled to refinance
short term notes into long and medium term notes. Assistance from Germany opened the
door, and the majority of the rest of Iran's short term debt was refinanced. 143
To facilitate hard currency needed to meet the refinanced debt burden, Iran has
implemented a sharp cutback in imports. To illustrate the magnitude of this cutback, imports
have dropped from a high of $28 billion in 1991- 1992, to a current $11.5 billion in 1995 -
1996.
144
While this has occurred, debt service obligations have been reduced from $6.7 billion
in 1996 - 1997, to a projected $4.7 billion in 1997 - 1998. Overall debt has been reduced to
about $23 billion while payments in arrears have been reduced to $200 million. 145
F. US OPPOSITION, LIMITED SUCCESS
Meeting this significant economic challenge was possible despite US opposition
because most of the debt was owed to European and Asian trading partners rather than US
firms. Asking the tax payers of these other trading partners of Iran to carry the economic
burden for US political policy was not a realistic option. This ineffective policy of opposition
in the international banking world provided the Iranian regime a public relations coup in terms
of evading the impact of US policy. 146 The ability to generate consensus and implement
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unpopular policy actions could only be accomplished through regime and national unity. In this
case, US opposition provided a common enemy around which to rally. The debt owed to
European and Asian firms limited the ability of the US to intervene. The unexpected unity of
the Iranian regime allowed, at least temporary, success in the resolution of this finance crisis.
The manner in which the regime was able to weather the debt crisis, by cutting
expenses, reducing debt interest loads, establishing a common goal, and providing a national
direction was not readily anticipated by most Western analysts. One of the most revealing
aspects of the regime is that when pushed into a corner, when action must be taken to ensure
its survival, then it seems capable of not only achieving consensus, but also applying lessons
provided by the international marketplace. The adaptation of the regime and implementation of
these kinds of international lessons clearly shows the pressures driving the regime to consensus.
Not only does this illustrate some adroit political maneuvering, it also serves to reinforce some
level of regime creditability. Creditability, is a key to good structures of government which are
subsequently essential elements ofgrowth.
Despite the ability demonstrated by the regime to meet significant economic challenges,
the measures implemented to facilitate the resolution of the debt crisis have brought along their
own baggage. Specifically, the recent election points to the disillusionment permeating society
concerning the necessity and effectiveness of the radical measures enacted to allow the survival
ofthe regime with little apparent concern for the hardships of the population.
G. STRUCTURAL THEORY AND TRANSITION
To fit this into the theory of the importance of structures of government is not difficult,
in fact there is a direct parallel in terms of the hostility of the regime to the winds of change
blowing towards establishment of a market system. By shifting to, or establishing a focus on
the effectiveness of market structures rather than the moral superiority of one decision over
another, the regime may yet be able to transition into an effective structure without completely
destroying the present structures. This would seem to be a goal one would assume the ruling
clerics and business people ought to find appealing.
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One of the two major challenges to be faced in the transition from central planning to
market structures is the importance of dealing with the time consistency problem. This occurs
when the ruler or rulers have a vested interest in establishing rules which may limit their
predatory powers. For only through subjection to such a rule of law system can predictability
and creditability be established, paving the way for economic security and growth.
The second element which must be dealt with during the transition from centrally
planned systems to market structures is the necessity to deal with the ideological push for
individualism and social equality. The growing demands of just the youthful population will
continue to place the regime and it clerics under great pressure to produce or make available
consumer goods and products. 147 Belt tightening, by significantly restricting imports worked
once, but there is little guarantee that today's young people will affirm the necessity of sacrifice
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
The case of Iran is unique in the establishing of fundamentalist religious systems. The
scope of the effort and the rate at which it was accomplished both serve to reinforce its unique
status among developing fundamentalist based systems. While Iran is unique, it is also
representative of the goals ofmost modern fundamentalist based systems in particular. Strictly
adhering to religious precepts is considered desirable even in the face of increasing evidence
that such attempts are likely to contribute to economic stagnation and slow growth. The idea
that there should be some mechanism with which to balance the desire for consumer goods and
adherence to religious concepts is persuasive. Unfortunately, there is no system which has
been able to demonstrate success in this attempt. Economic reality has made clear that
superior morality cannot replace economic efficiency in the marketplace.
At issue is the potential for such fundamentalist systems in general, and in the case of
Iran specifically. The application of the theory of the importance of structures of government
implies that it is the process which is responsible for establishing one system as more stable
than another. If then organization is key, is there any reason why a fundamentalist based
system could not establish these structures? The answer appears to be that there is no specific
hindrance for a fundamentalist based system which may choose to apply these theories of
governance and growth. It seems clear that any system of government with the proper
motivation should be able to establish a solid framework for development and maintenance of
good structures ofgovernment.
Will existing fundamentalist systems choose to pursue this path? This is more difficult
to answer. In the case of Iran, it seems that moderate forces are shifting the regime towards
less active intervention in the markets. Will the clerics allow this to continue unchallenged?
Likely not. Vested interests and an unstable basis for their political, if not religious, positions
are unlikely to be mediated any time soon. This seems to leave Iran and perhaps
fundamentalist systems in general awash in a sea of possibilities without land in sight. What
seems clear, is that the potential should exist for Iranian stability through good structures of
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government leading towards growth and modernization. The key to this potential rests with
the clerics and their willingness to let go oftheir strangle hold on the nation's economy.
Decisions which seem to positively contribute to long term growth include schooling
and investment in education, capital savings, and expenditures in equipment modernization, and
improvements in human capital. 149 Dealing with these elements individually, shows that, in
many cases, Iran is in an arguably good position to position itself for future growth. For this to
happen problems associated with existing structures of government must be overcome in order
to capitalize on the potential strengths of the nation.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), Middle East Department, chaired by Paul
Chabrier, made recommendations to Iran in an effort to provide some clear policy direction for
the regime. All of the IMF recommendations include establishing or moving towards a rule of
law system and subsequent reliance on the market to drive economic decisions with
governmental oversight. These recommendations include: unification of exchange rates,
introduction of a value added tax, cutting energy subsidies, liberalizing trade and allowing more
autonomy to the central bank.
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If implemented, Iran could be seen as pursuing a serious
effort to stabilize the economic situation and create an environment for growth which would
help placate lending banks fears of the fundamentalist regime. 151
Applying the principles conducive to long-term growth, Iran has a youthful and
growing population, underdeveloped natural resources, decreasing debt, a recently elected
pragmatist as president, and a location that once served as a major trade route to the East.
While the clerical regime is strongly opposed by current US policy, this same policy in practice,
has effectively limited US policy options to those resting within the scope of military
intervention. Through early recognition of the inevitability and importance of the economic
potential of Iran, the US can improve its regional position and influence without decreasing its
1 49
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security. Ignoring or underestimating these positive aspects of Iran may leave US policy and
business out of position to capitalize on opportunities in the region. Further, as fundamentalist
systems continue their world-wide growth, acceptance of the potential for establishing quasi-
democratic pro-market structures will be necessary for the West in order to continue their
leadership position in the international community. The IMF recent shifted from their position
of linking credit to inflation and deficits to one supporting good governance. 153 This change
may produce some statistical information to further support the contention of this thesis that
structures of government are more important than the form of regime in establishing economic
stability.
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